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INTRODUCTION 
Development of a knowledge  base for an expert system often 
requires an analysis of the inference processes and decision 
making strategies of one or more experts. Knowledge engineers 
therefore share the psychologist's and operations researcher's 
interest in inference and decision making. Psychologists  have 
been interested in understanding and describing how people make 
ferences under complexity and uncertainty. Operations 
searchers  have developed methods that extend human ability to 
ake decisions about complex problems. 
Both operations researchers  and psychologists have  developed 
thods for modeling inference and decision making. The 
ychologists'  methods produce descriptive models: they describe 
actually  behave. Operations researchers  produce 
ve  models: they prescribe optimal strategies or 
flclent heuristics for coping with complex problems [I]. 
earchers in both areas have produced models which have not 
y equaled expert performance, but have outperformed experts. 
mples of research in these areas will be briefly described and 
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Know1  edge engineers general  1  y rely on experts' verbal 
descriptions of their reasoning. This approach (process  tracing 
or protocol analysis)  has been used in psychology as well 
(Kleinmuntz,  1968; Ericsson and Simon, 1984). Traditionally, 
however, psychologists have been suspici.ous  of verbal reports, 
and they have developed methods for analyzing judgment that do 
not depend on a person's ability to  provide accurate verbal 
descriptions of thinking processes. 
One such method, called judgment analysis, derives the 
parameters of judgment from a statistical analysis of a sample 
of actual judgments (Hammond et al., 1975). The expert is 
required to do only what he or she does best, that is, to make 
judgments in a natural setting using familiar materials. The 
analyst then uses standard statistical methods to develop a 
model that describes the inference process that produced the 
sample of judgments. In other words, the analyst produces a 
statistical  model of the expert's inference process. 
The  data  required  forthe  development  of  such  amodel  are  a 
number of cases of a particular type of judgment. Each case 
includes the information used to make the judgment and the 
resulting judgment. Cases may be obtained in a natural setting 
(e.g.,  loan application decisions obtained from bank files) or in 
controlled settings. In  a controlled setting, an expert is asked 
to make judgments based on a sample  of real or hypothetical 
scenarios. The size of the sample required is dictated by the 
standard statistical requirements  for reliability of parameter 
estimates. Table 1 illustrates two scenarios  that might be used 
in a study of judgments of bank loan officers. Wilsted et al. 
(1975)  asked 165 bankers to evaluate 50 different loan 
applications, similar to those illustrated in Table 1. 
The items of information that are available  to the judge, 
called cues, are considered independent variables in a 
statistical analysis with the judgment as the dependent variabl 
Multiple regression analysis is typically used to analyze  the 
data, but other methods may be more appropriate in particular 
applications. The analysis  yields a model of the judge, which 
expresses the judgment as a mathematical function (generally  a 
polynomial)  ofthecues,  and an  index  of  how  well  themodel  fit 
the judgments (e.g.,  the squared multiple correlation Table 1. Hypothetical loan applications. 
LOAN APPLICATION  A 
Amount requested:  $15,000 
Age:  36  No. of Dependents:  3  - 
Years with present employer:  4  - 
Monthly Income:  1950  Total loan payments:  758 
Average Checking Account Balance:  500 
Average Savings Account Balance:  3500 
Occupation:  White collar  Own or rent home:  Own 
Credit rating (1-4)  :  -  4 
Marketability of Collateral (1-4)  :  3  - 
I  LOAN APPLICATION  B 
Amount requested:  $12,500 
I  Age:  31  No. of Dependents:  -  3 
I 
Years with present employer:  -  1 
Monthly Income:  1100  Total loan payments:  340 
Average Checking Account Balance:  300 
Average Savings Account Balance:  6000 
Occupation:  Skilled  Own or rent home:  Rent 
Credit rating (1-4)  :  -  3 
Marketability of Collateral (1-4):  -  2 coefficient, or coefficient of determination). For example, in 
thewilsted  etal.  study  themeanofthe  squaredmultiple 
correlations for the 165 bankers was ,709. Since we do not expect 
judges to  be perfectly reliable,  squared  multiple correlations 
ranging from .7 to .9  are typical in judgment studies and 
indicate a reasonably good fit of the model to the judgments. 
Figure 1 illustrates how a model based on a statistical 
analysis of judgments of one judge can be interpreted graphically 
for  a simplified problem involving  only three cues. The graphic 
interpretation of the regression model is based on transforma- 
tions described by Hammond et al.  (1975). The figure illustrates 
the decomposition of judgment into relative  weights for each 
of the cues and the form of the functional relationship between 
each cue and the overall judgment. Such decomposition  and graphic 
displays have produced useful insights into the judgment process. 
Although the use of statistical  models of inference can be 
found as early as 1923 (Wallace,  1923), extensive use of the 
method began in the mid-1950s  (Hammond, 1955; Hoffman, 1960). 
Several cbmputer programs for judgment analysis, including 
versions for personal computers,  are available [2].  A description 
of Social Judgment Theory, which is the theoretical foundation 
for judgment analysis, and a description of the method itself can 
be found in Hammond et al.  (1975). A variety of experts have been 
modeled including physicians (e.g., Fisch et al. 1981; Kirwan et 
al., 1983), stock brokers, clinical psychologists, and polygraph 
interpreters. Although the models were capable of approximating 
intelligent  behavior in restricted domains, they were used only 
as research tools. No one thought of marketing them as expert 
systems. 
Statistical Models vs.  --  Human Judgment 
One of the striking findings of the early research on 
statistical models of judgment was that, for both novice and 
expert judges, across a variety of problem domains, simple 
linear additive models provided a description of the judgment 
process that accurately reproduced the original judgments 
(Slovic and Lichtenstein, 1971). Even more striking was that the 
models consistently outperformed expert judges themselves in 
tasks where a correct answer was available (Goldberg,  1970). 
This occurred because the models excluded the residual component 309 
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An important line of research comparing human judgment and 
statistical models involved diagnosis of mental illness based on 
the results of a psychological test called the Minnesota 
Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI). The results of this 
paper and pencil test for an individual consist of scores on 11 
scales. In the 1950s,  use of the MMPI for diagnosis (e.g, of 
psychosis vs. neurosis) was thought to require an understanding 
of complex patterns of interactions among the 11 scales. 
Developers of the MMPI argued that without extensive training 
and experience clinicians could not make proper use of the 
scores,  and they discounted the possibility that any simple 
model, such as a sum of weighted scale scores, could capture the 
richness of the diagnostic process (Goldberg,  1969). They felt 
that human judgment was an essential element of the process. 
The clinicians'  arguments for the complexity of the process 
of interpreting  MMPI results and for the essential role of human 
judgment disintegrated as a result of a series of studies of 
clinical judgment: 
1.  When both experienced clinicians and graduate students 
judged whether patients were medically or psychiatrically 
hospitalized, the judgments of the experienced clinicians 
were no better than those of the graduate students (Oskamp, 
1967). 
2.  Using psychiatric diagnoses (based on extensive interviews) 
of each patient as a criterion, statistical diagnoses of 
psychosis vs. neurosis, based on a multiple regression 
model of the relation between the MMPI scales and the 
correct diagnosis, outperformed the diagnoses made by the 
clinicians (Goldberg,  1969). 
3.  Diagnoses based on regression models of the clinicians'  own 
judgments outperformed the clinicians themselves (Goldberg, 
1970). 
4.  The clinicians were beaten by a model which simply added 
the 11 equally weighted scores (Dawes  and Corrigan, 1976). 
This work suggested a method called bootstrapping for 
improving judgment. Under certain conditions, accuracy can be improved by replacing the expert with a statistical model of his 
or her own judgment process.  Camerer (1981) cited 15 studies 
showing an improvement in accuracy due to bootstrapping. The 
studies included judgments of graduate school success, survival 
predictions based on cancer biopsies, diagnosis of mental 
illness,  personnel interviewing,  students1  judgments of teacher 
effectiveness, and selection of 1  if  e insurance salesmen. 
Armstrong (1985) reviews the evidence for the usefulness of 
bootstrapping. He cites examples of success involving  judgments 
about electronics production and catalog sales, as well as 
forecasts of sales success of personnel, returns for securities, 
loan defaults, and bankruptcy. 
Although the work on bootstrapping is intriguing and has 
yielded important insights into some of the limitations  of expert 
judgment, it is not universally applicable nor does it guarantee 
improved accuracy. It can only be applied to problems which are 
amenable to statistical modeling (this  point is taken up below), 
and the properties of task and judge that are necessary for the 
success of bootstrapping have been described by Camerer (1981). 
Implications for Knowledge Engineering 
It is interesting to speculate about what would have 
happened in the 1950s if an attempt had been made to use 
today's methods to develop an expert system for clinical 
diagnosis from the MMPI. Knowledge engineers would have had no 
reason to question the expert clinicians1  views regarding the 
complexity and richness of the interpretation process. Extensive 
me and effort would have been spent trying to capture the 
btleties of the diagnostic process. In fact, complicated 
jective rules for diagnosis from the MMPI were being developed 
the 1950s (Meehl and Dahlstrorn, 1960). These rules performed 
better than simple linear models (Goldberg, 1969). 
nsequently, an expert system based on such rules would not 
ve outperformed one developed in much less time using a simple 
near regression analysis. The MMPI experience suggests that 
owledge engineers should regard experts1  descriptions of their 
ference processes with some skepticism and explore the utility 
simple decision-making models. 
Limitations of judgment analysis.  We are not, of course, 
commending that knowledge  engineers discard verbal protocols and production functions  and adopt statistical  models exclusively 
in their work. The research to date has necessarily involved 
static, rather than dynamic tasks (Hogarth, 1981) involving 
judgments based on a few (5-20) items of information, and 
generally there is both high uncertainty in the task and fairly 
high inconsistency in the judgments of the expert. Furthermore, 
application of the method is not always straightforward.  Research 
has shown a number of limitations  and potential pitfalls in the 
use of statistical analyses  to develop  zodels  of judgment. 
Results not only depend on the context in which the judgments  are 
generated, they also depend on how the data are analyzed. 
Although there are many situations where the modeling process can 
be more or less automatic, there are others where the expertise 
of an experienced judgment analyst is required. More research is 
needed to determine when such  models might be useful in knowledge 
engineering. 
The use of statistical  methods to develop models of judgment 
has been criticized on the grounds that the inference  process is 
so complex that statistical modeling is impossible or 
impractical. It is argued that, since judgments about important 
problems general  1  y involve  multiple variables  that  interact in 
complex patterns, statistical modeling would require an 
unreasonable  number of cases, and would 1  ikel  y produce misleading 
results. There are undoubtedly problems for which this is the 
case. For example,  no applications of judgment analysis to 
weather forecasting have been reported in the literature. 
(However,  the results of Allen et al, 1986, indicate that simple 
statistical methods may prove useful in this context as well.) 
Experience has shown,  however, that for many problems, 
statistical modeling is practical and useful. OIBrien  (l985), for 
example, reports a successful application of judgment analysis to 
strategic decision making in R &  D management and argues that 
judgment analysis can outperform knowledge engineering in this 
context. Even very complex  problems can often be decomposed into 
subproblems, one or more of which may be amenable to judgment 
analysis. 
Judgment  analysis and verbal protocols.  Judgment analysis 
offers a major advantage as a tool for  knowledge engineering: It 
provides a method for modeling inference that does not rely on 
the expert's ability to describe his or her thinking process. 
This is important because judgmental competence is not always 
accompanied by the ability to describe accurately the process that produced the judgments. Verbal descriptions of reasoning can 
be incomplete, inaccurate or misleading. Some important aspects 
of the expert's inference process may not be readily accessible 
and may be difficult to translate into words. The description 
obtained may be unduly influenced by the  method used to elicit 
it. QU~S~~O~S  posed by the knowledge engineer and the require- 
ments of particular shells impose a frame on the problem. 
Seeming1  y irrelevant and inconsequential aspects of problem 
framing have been shown to have a powerful effect on judgment 
(Tversky and Kahneman, 1981). For these reasons, it is desirable 
to have a knowledge engineering tool that does not depend on the 
expert's ability to describe the inference process. 
There is another reason that knowledge engineers should not 
rely completely on verbal descriptions. A series  of descriptive 
studies of judgment, initiated by a classic paper by Tversky and 
Kahneman (1974), has identified a number of mental strategies 
that can lead to errors in judgments. Research results repeatedly 
recount systematic biases in judgment, the inconsistent and 
poor1  y control  led nature of the judgment  process, the pervasive- 
ness of cognitive limitations that can reduce the validity of 
judgments, and the difficulty of overcoming those limitations 
(Hogarth, 1980; Kahneman et al., 1982).  Irrelevant features of 
judgment tasks can strongly influence  judgment  while relevant 
information is often ignored or used inappropriately. These 
biases and limitations  have been found in both expert and lay 
judges. Although the generality of some of this research is 
currently being debated, and some researchers are adopting a more 
optimistic view of human cognitive ability (Ebbesen and Konecni, 
1980; Nisbett et al., 1983; Kruglanski et al., 1984), the 
possibility that expertsf  cognitive processes are flawed cannot 
be discounted. For example, Stewart and Glantz (1985) described 
how the judgments of expert climatologists may have been biased. 
Although verbal descriptions of reasoning are likely to 
emain a staple of knowledge engineering, they should not be the 
nly tool. Judgment analysis can be used in combination with 
erbal protocols (Einhorn, et al., 1979) so that the knowledge 
ngineer can take advantage of the insights provided by both 
hile avoiding their pitf  a1  1s. If the knowledge  engineer relies 
olely on the expert's verbal statements, then both the 
fficiency of system development and the ultimate performance of 
e system will be limited by the expert's ability to verbally 
scribe his or her inference process. PRESCRIPTIVE  MODELS 
Under the circumstances,  one strategy for the knowledge 
engineer is to be aware of potential biases and limitations of 
expert judgment and to guard against them by using a combination 
of methods to elicit information about the inference process. 
But another strategy is to strive to improve the knowledge base 
through critical, in-depth thinking about the nature of the 
problem and by using analytic models that can, in many cases, 
far exceed the limited information processing capabilities of a 
human expert in certain problem-solving settings. 
since World War 11,  operations researchers have been 
approaching problems using such models, that is, by developing 
prescriptive models of decision making. By and large their 
efforts have been directed toward decision problems in which the 
important  variables can be expressed in quantitative terms. 
Especially interesting to operations researchers  have been 
management problems in resource allocation. Examples include: 
o determining how many of what products to produce in each of 
several alternative production facilities,  and how the 
output should be transported to various possible 
distribution facilities in such a way as to minimize costs; 
o identifying that mix of investments which will maximize the 
return, commensurate  with the investor's risk propensities; 
o assigning work to employees in such a way as to minimize 
the elapsed time required for completion of a project. 
As the wording above implies, the emphasis has been not 
just on producing good decisions, but on producing optimal 
decisions,  that is maximizing or minimizing with respect to some 
quantitatively specified criterion. Thus, operations researchers 
have sought to build knowledge bases that perform not only as 
well as, but in most cases significantly better than experts. 
Managerial Decision Making 
We predict that a substantial portion of the most useful 
work in knowledge  based systems, in the years ahead, will focus 
on problems faced by managers in both the public and the priva sectors. The opportunities are substantial. Whereas managers 
themselves have tended to look at blue collar  operations for 
opportunities for increased productivity, it is generally agreed 
among students of administration that the administrative 
hierarchy itself is the place to look for improvement 
opportunities.  Of course, it is just such managerial problems 
that have occupied operations researchers for 40 years. 
We hasten  to  add  that  by nomeans  do  all  management  decision 
problems lend themselves to treatment in this fashion. The 
factors to be considered in many important management problem 
settings simply cannot be usefully quantified. This is especially 
true at higher, policy levels of management. 
On the other hand, most commerce and industry managers serve 
at lower operational levels.  And at the operations level  many 
problem settings involve  factors  which readily 1  end themselves  to 
quantification, such as the scheduling of work, budgeting, and 
price  determination. 
Managerial Robotics 
In general, systems that support managers in dealing with 
judgment problems amenable to quantification are referred to as 
decision support systems. The knowledge bases for such systems 
can frequently be made substantially  more useful by invoking  the 
formal analytic methods that assure optimality. Looking further 
into the future, however,  we forsee systems that go beyond merely 
supporting managers;  we predict that managerial robots may become 
prevalent in the administrative  hierarchy of both public and 
private enterprises. 
A managerial robot is the managerial counterpart of an 
ndustrial robot. An industrial robot does not simply support a 
raft worker, but rather replaces that worker in performing that 
ange of functions for which it was designed. In a similar way, a 
anagerial robot does not just support a manager in the 
erformance of some management function,  but rather replaces the 
anager in the performance of that management function. 
anagerial robots will only become prevalent if they can perform 
a fashion significantly superior to the managers they replace, 
perior  both inthe  quality  ofthe  judgments  made  andthe  speed 
th which they are made. The usefulness of  managerial robots will  depend on  the 
ability of  their designers to  accomodate all  the features in a 
judgment  setting which  real world managers  face.  A  system that 
simply supports a manager  in a particular judgment  setting can 
fall far short of  displaying the full range of  the manager's 
skills in dealing with that setting.  But  a system that replaces 
the manager  can tolerate no  such inadequacies. 
Example:  The Combinatoric Explosion 
For management  problems,  as well as all  other problems,  the 
number  of possible decisions,  or problem solutions,  increases 
geometrically as the number  of  variables increases.  This 
combinatoric explosion is a problem for managers,  knowledge 
engineers,  and  operations researchers.  In an effort to contain 
the many  possible combinations of  variable values and produce 
optimal solutions,  operations researchers rely on formal 
algorithmic methods  such as the simplex procedure of  linear 
programming  and  its many  variants. 
In some  operations level management problems,  however,  the 
combinatoric explosion proves totally  unmanageable when  formal 
analytic tools are employed.  Yet recent experience has shown that 
cleverly designed heuristics can contain the explosion-- 
heuristics which  result from  in-depth  analysis of  a type expert 
managers  are not likely to invoke,  either because they are ill 
equipped to  perform the required analysis, or because the gains 
which might  be enjoyed from  superior judgments  are not believed 
to justify the time and effort which  would  be required. 
In1984 the  coveted Lanchester Prizewas awardedto  a group 
producing  optimal  solutions for a series of  scheduling problems. 
Each  used a  large mainframe to investigate some  3,000 variables 
(Crowder,  et.  al.,  1984). In fact, however,  many  real world 
scheduling problems,  when  formulated in such a way  that 
demonstrably optimal soutions can be produced,  involve up to four 
million variables.  To  produce their optimal solutions the winners 
of  the Lanchester Prize were  obliged to ignore features of  the 
problem which  are important to  managers. 
Recently,  another group of  researchers has attacked large 
scheduling problems successfully, producing solutions which were within 98 percent of optimal in minutes on a small micro- 
computer (Glover, et.  al.,  1985).  By being willing to accept 
solutions  which only approached optimality, this group was able 
to satisfy all those features in the problem setting  which were 
important to management. Their approach relied entirely on a 
skillfully  designed hierarchy of heuristic  rules  and yielded a 
knowledge based system which produces schedules  not only faster 
than an experienced human expert, but also  produces schedules 
which are superior to those constructed by a human expert. 
In the latter case, the researchers  who addressed the 
scheduling problem gained insights into the nature of the problem 
which equipped them to construct a scheduling system  which did 
not simply support the manager in planning the employees1  work, 
but which rather replaced the manager altogether--a true 
managerial robot. 
To summarize, the methods of the operations researchers 
directly address some of the limitations  of human cognitive 
ility identified by psychologists. Unlike the human expert,  an 
erations research model can sometimes cope  with complexity and 
certainty in a systematic, controlled,  and explicit  manner. We 
ggest, therefore, that knowledge engineers addressing 
nagement problems will want to exploit  many of the insights 
ich researchers in this field have gained. 
We have illustrated some  of the approaches  knowledge 
ngineers could usefully  borrow from psychology and operations 
earch. Research suggests that, for some problems, expert 
tems developed using these approaches can outperform human 
erts. 
The appropriate set of methods for any knowledge engineering 
lication depends upon the nature of the problem and the 
erts involved. At present, there is no comprehensive theory to 
dethe  selection  of  a set  of  methods  for  a  particular 
blem/expert combination. Further research is needed to 
cover how best to integrate new methods into knowledge 
neering and how to choose the appropriate set for a 
icular  application. Such research would involve  the 
ication of multiple  methods to  multiple  problems, and the evaluation of results in terms of system development time and 
system performance criteria such as data demands, speed, and 
accuracy. Such a research program could contribute to expert 
system development by allowing knowledge  engineers to  make more 
effective use of previous work on modeling judgment and decision 
processes. 
NOTES 
1. The distinction between descriptive and prescriptive models 
is, of course, not as clear as we have drawn it here. It can be 
argued that the distinction is meaningless because what is 
descriptive from one perspective may be prescriptive from 
another. For our purposes, descriptive and prescriptive models 
are distinguished by the criteria for their validation. 
Descriptive models are validated according to their ability to 
reproduce human behavior. prescriptive models are validated 
according to the quality of their performance on a specified 
task. 
2. One computer program for judgment analysis is being marketed 
as an aid to the development of expert systems.  offm man  (1986) 
describes some advantages of this approach. 
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